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Notes
Appealing to Reason-able Expectations of
Privacy: Increasing Appellate Review
Under ECPA
Andrew Tyler Ohlert*
The Snowden revelations of 2013 sparked widespread, public discussion about the
amount of government surveillance performed on American citizens under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act. This dialogue often sidesteps the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act, however, which is the primary statute that governs the government’s ability to
obtain the electronic communications of everyday citizens. The vast majority of requests
for information under ECPA are pursued ex parte, and often without notice to a targeted
individual that the government has obtained her information. This secrecy regime leaves
targeted individuals unable to oppose the government or appeal adverse decisions.
Moreover, if a magistrate judge disagrees with the government and denies its request for
an individual’s information, the government can simply apply to other judges until a
judge grants access to the information.
This Note examines the resulting lack of appellate precedent that has developed from a
system where the government has no opposition, and American citizens have no
opportunity to be heard. This Note suggests three solutions to increase opposition to the
government and incentivize the development of binding, appellate precedent under
ECPA.

* J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of California Hastings College of the Law; B.S. in Computer
Science, 2012, Virginia Tech. I would like to thank Professor Evan Tseng Lee for his invaluable
assistance with this Note, as well as Susan Freiwald for inspiring this topic. I would also like to thank
my Father for teaching me chess.
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Introduction
The Snowden revelations in June of 2013 recently revealed to the
American public how extensively the U.S. government has engaged in
1
widespread and mass surveillance. Secret courts under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) hear approximately 1000 secret
2
cases a year. But that number pales in comparison to the number of ex
parte applications filed under the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act (“ECPA”) that seek to collect targeted online information of American
3
citizens.
A conservative estimate of sealed ECPA applications estimated that
over 30,000 ECPA applications were filed to magistrate judges in 2006
4
alone. And a survey of just five technology companies in the first six
5
months of 2014 verifies that estimate. During that time, Microsoft received
6919 requests for user information from the government, targeting 15,730
6
user accounts for information; Google received a total number of 12,539
7
requests for user information, targeting 21,576 user accounts; Yahoo!
8
received 4865 total government requests, targeting 9752 user accounts;
1. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers
Daily, Guardian, (June 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizoncourt-order (discussing just one aspect of the National Security Agency’s domestic surveillance program).
2. Stephen Wm. Smith, Gagged, Sealed & Delivered: Reforming ECPA’s Secret Docket, 6 Harv.
L. & Pol’y Rev. 313, 313 (2012).
3. Id. at 315, 320–22.
4. Id. at 320–22; see also Tim Reagan & George Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Sealed Cases in
Federal Courts (2009), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sealcafc.pdf/$file/sealcafc.pdf
(providing the sealed case information on which Judge Smith based his estimations).
5. See Microsoft, Law Enforcement Requests Report 2014: January-June, 2014,
http://www.microsoft.com/about/corporatecitizenship/en-us/reporting/transparency/ (last visited Aug.
5, 2015) [hereinafter Microsoft]; see also Apple, Report on Government Information Requests (Jan.
1–June 30, 2014), https://www.apple.com/privacy/docs/government-information-requests-20140630.pdf
(last visited Aug. 5, 2015) [hereinafter Apple]; Transparency Report, Google, http://www.google.com/
transparencyreport/userdatarequests/data/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2015) [hereinafter Google];
Transparency Report: Government Data Requests, Yahoo!, https://transparency.yahoo.com/governmentdata-requests/index.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2015) [hereinafter Yahoo!]; United States Information
Requests, Twitter, https://transparency.twitter.com/country/us (last visited Aug. 5, 2015) [hereinafter
Twitter].
6. Microsoft, Law Enforcement Requests Report 2014: July-December, 2014, at 2,
http://www.microsoft.com/about/corporatecitizenship/en-us/reporting/transparency/. The data contained
within this Note focuses exclusively on requests for information made by the U.S. government.
7. Google, supra note 5, at 9. In the United States, Google received 8211 subpoenas, 165 pen
register orders, 171 emergency disclosure requests, 3187 search warrants, 7 wiretap orders, and 798
“other” court orders. Id.
8. Yahoo!, supra note 5. Of these 4865 requests, Yahoo disclosed “content” information in 1157
requests, and it disclosed “non-content” information in 2887 requests. Id.
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Apple received 789 requests targeting 1739 user accounts; and Twitter
received 1257 requests for account information targeting 1918 user
10
accounts. Together, these five technology companies alone received 26,369
requests in just six months. In 2013, these same companies received a
combined total of 55,689 requests for account information targeting 128,005
11
user accounts. But in spite of the incredible number of requests received
12
by Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”), there is almost zero guidance on
13
the proper standards required under ECPA.
This Note seeks to reinvigorate privacy law within the United States
by increasing appellate review of ex parte ECPA applications and
fostering an adversarial system that will encourage courts to develop
binding law within the realm of privacy law. Part I discusses the statutory
history of ECPA and explains how each branch of government has, thus
far, failed to elaborate on the standards required under ECPA. Part II
discusses ECPA’s statutory structure to explain why courts have been
unable to address the constitutional issues surrounding new technologies.
Part III reviews existing case law under ECPA and the Fourth
Amendment to demonstrate the lack of guiding precedent for lower
courts. Part IV suggests three potential solutions to increase appellate
review of ex parte ECPA orders, including that Congress allow courts to
appoint a “Constitutional Advocate” to oppose the government in ex
14
parte hearings under these statutes. And Part V discusses the Article III
standing implications that such a Constitutional Advocate would have to
overcome.

I. Background of ECPA
As it stands now, every branch of government has refused to elaborate
on the standards required by the Fourth Amendment under ECPA. First,
the executive branch has actively sought to expand its ability to gather
9. Apple, supra note 5, at 5. These numbers only include the number of account requests and do
not include National Security Letters or requests for device information.
10. Twitter, supra note 5.
11. See Microsoft, supra note 5; see also Google, supra note 5, at 67; Yahoo!, supra note 5;
Apple, supra note 5; Twitter, supra note 5.
12. For simplicity, this Note refers to Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”), but it is important to
note that ECPA does not distinguish between ISPs and general Service Providers. See 18 U.S.C. §
2702(a) (2014). ECPA does state, however, that a “provider” is any person or entity that provides an
“electronic communication service” or “computing service” to the public. Id. So, while Google or any
other public provider of electronic or computing services would qualify as a “provider” limited by the
statute, a private employer would not. Id.
13. For example, it is often unclear whether subsections of ECPA or the Fourth Amendment
require probable cause in the context of the specific technology at issue. See infra Part III.A.
14. Intelligence Oversight and Surveillance Reform Act, S. 1551, 113th Cong. § 402(b) (1st Sess.
2013) (enacted) (establishing within the judiciary a Constitutional Advocate to review each application
submitted to and decision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISA Court”), and authorizing
the advocate to participate in FISA Court proceedings or a petition review pool proceeding and to appeal
any decisions of such bodies).
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15

information and avoid judicial review. A decision by a magistrate judge is
not binding on other magistrate judges, and thus, if one magistrate denies
the government’s request, the government can simply apply to another
16
magistrate who might be more sympathetic to its case. Given that the
17
executive branch is “chiefly responsible for law enforcement,” it makes
sense that prosecutors “tend to gravitate toward a judge who is known to
18
view their requests less critically.” And because the executive branch has
the flexibility to apply to various judges that endorse its own interpretation
of the law, it would understandably avoid appealing cases and risking the
19
establishment of contrary binding precedent by an appellate judge.
20
Second, while Congress has amended ECPA five times, only one of
those amendments—the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
21
Act (“CALEA”) of 1994 —has actually attempted to modernize the
22
standards that should apply to information under ECPA. ECPA is no
15. See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical CellSite Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 580 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d (Nov. 29, 2010) (discussing Hearing on
Elec. Commc’ns Privacy Act Reform & the Revolution in Location Based Techs. & Servs. Before the
Subcomm. On the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th,
Cong. (statement of Stephen Wm. Smith, U.S. Mag. J., at 3–7 & n.14) (June 24, 2010), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/pdf/Smith100624.pdf) [hereinafter ECPA Reform Committee]).
16. Smith, supra note 2, at 328; see also RLJCS Enters. Inc. v. Prof’l Ben. Trust Multiple Emp’r
Welfare Ben. Plan & Trust, 487 F.3d 494, 499 (7th Cir. 2007).
17. Stephen Wm. Smith, Standing Up for Mr. Nesbitt, 47 U.S.F. L. Rev. 257, 258 (2012).
18. ECPA Reform Committee, supra note 15, at 12.
19. See infra Part II.C.
20. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510–2522 (2014), available
at https://it.ojp.gov/default.aspx?area=privacy&page=1285 (last updated July 30, 2013) (discussing the
history of amendments to ECPA).
21. See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103–414, § 103(a)(2)(B),
108 Stat. 4279, 4281 (1994) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1021 (2014)). The Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”) amended the Stored Communications Act
(“SCA”) to differentiate between customer information and “record[s] or other information . . . (not
including the contents of communications).” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)–(2) (2014). To obtain customer
information, CALEA simply required the government to obtain an administrative subpoena. Id. §
2703(c)(2). But to obtain “other information,” CALEA required the government to obtain a warrant
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a § 2703(d) court order, or the consent of the
target. Id. § 2703(c)(1); see also id. § 2703(d); Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(d)(1). CALEA also prohibited the
use of pen registers to obtain phone location data. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B) (2014).
22. Other amendments have failed to address other common critiques of ECPA. For example,
the SCA allows law enforcement officials to obtain e-mails stored for more than 180 days, at which
point the e-mail is considered abandoned. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). When ECPA was enacted, it was
routine for service providers to only store e-mail until it could be transmitted to the recipient, and it
made sense that the e-mail could be collected if it was still on the ISP’s servers after 180 days because
that delay signaled that the recipient had essentially abandoned the e-mail. A common criticism of the
SCA, which has remained unaddressed by Congress, is that this distinction is outdated because modern
e-mail services, such as Gmail or Hotmail, will now store e-mails indefinitely, at least partly because of
this statute. Interview with Eric Schmidt, CEO, Google, Inc. (Oct. 2, 2009, 4:11 PM), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=113450803. Instead of allowing the
government to collect abandoned e-mails that users have no interest in collecting, the statute actually
facilitates another way for the government to access everyday communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)
(requiring ISPs to preserve records pending the issuance of a court order).
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exception to the legislative trend that “[h]istorically, Congress has dragged
its heels in protecting communications privacy until the courts have
23
demanded it.”
Third, the judicial branch has remained unable to exercise appellate
review of these cases because there is little binding precedent and parties
24
rarely appeal cases. For example, although CALEA was enacted in 1994,
the law continues to be unclear as to whether cell site location information
(“CSLI”) qualifies as “location data” subject to the “specific and
articulable facts” standard of § 2703(d) of the Stored Communications Act
25
(“SCA”), or whether the Fourth Amendment requires the government to
26
27
produce “probable cause” to obtain CSLI. In the intervening twentyone years, the lack of appellate precedent has left this issue largely unsettled
and lower courts have been left without a binding interpretation of the
28
standards required under ECPA.
The most direct way for this area of the law to reflect modern privacy
expectations is to allow courts to develop binding precedent by interpreting
the Constitution. But the question then turns to why appellate review of
these proceedings is so anemic.

II. Secret Courts with No Opportunity or Incentive to Appeal
Every year 15,000 employment discrimination cases are filed in federal
court, and based on innumerable Supreme Court and circuit precedents,
every trial court knows what the plaintiff’s burden of proof is.
Inconceivable that it could be otherwise, most would agree. Yet, every
year more than twice that number of electronic surveillance cases are filed
and decided, with literally no binding precedent to specify the
government’s burden of proof when tracking your cell phone location.
29
How is that conceivable?

There are three primary reasons why ex parte ECPA orders are not
appealed. First, the secrecy measures surrounding ECPA and the SCA

23. Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law,
Not Fact, 70 Md. L. Rev. 681, 687 (2011); see also Smith, supra note 2, at 313 (“Although the ECPA has
often been amended, most changes have been technical tweaks to the existing framework.”).
24. See infra Part II.C.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 2703.
26. In re Application of U.S. For An Order Authorizing Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 736
F. Supp. 2d 578, 579 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d (Nov. 29, 2010).
27. Compare United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1211 (11th Cir. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part en banc, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015), with In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a
Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. To Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 2010)
(holding that the government was only required to articulate “specific and articulable facts” under §
2703(d), but that magistrate judges could require “probable cause” in their discretion).
28. Nesbitt, supra note 17 (“Like an absentee landlord, Congress has all but ignored this widening
breach since the problem first came to its attention in 1994.”); see also Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, § 103(a)(2)(B), 108 Stat. 4279, 4281 (1994) (codified at 47
U.S.C. §§ 1001–1021 (2014)).
29. Nesbitt, supra note 17, at 262.
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rarely provide notice to targeted individuals that the government has
obtained their electronic communications. Second, even where individuals
are given notice, that notice is not given until after the information is
obtained, creating excessively high barriers to the suppression of that
information. And third, once the government has obtained the information,
the only actual parties to the action have no incentive to appeal: (1) the
targeted individual must reach a prohibitively high burden to suppress
the information; (2) ISPs do not want to engage in a costly legal battle;
and (3) the government can simply sidestep rulings against it and apply
30
to other judges that are more likely to grant the ex parte order. The
result is a dearth of appellate precedent and little guidance as to the
31
proper standards required under ECPA and the Fourth Amendment.
32
ECPA governs the interception of electronic communications, and
ultimately is comprised of three titles. The first title, the Wiretap Act,
governs the “intercept[ion]” of communications, a term defined as the
“aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral
communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other
33
device.” The second title, the SCA, regulates the privacy of stored
34
communications. Stated more simply, the Wiretap Act governs the
interception of “communications while in transit,” whereas the SCA
35
governs communications once they have been stored. The third title, the
Pen Register Act, addresses “pen register and trap and trace devices,”
which capture the dialed numbers and related information from outgoing
36
or incoming calls or communications.
ECPA provides four standards upon which government requests for
information must be based, each standard increasing in scrutiny based
37
upon how invasive the order is : (1) pen registers and trap and trace

30. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info.,
736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 584 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d (Nov. 29, 2010) (“The result . . . has been an
unpredictable legal regime . . . . It is a regime in which prosecutors, rather than seeking to establish
predictable legal norms, understandably ‘tend to gravitate toward a judge who is known to view their
requests less critically.’” (quoting ECPA Reform Committee, supra note 15, at 12)).
31. Freiwald, supra note 23, at 682; see also Smith, supra note 2, at 326 (“During its twenty-five
year history, the ECPA has been the subject of only two Supreme Court decisions. By comparison,
over a similar period the Supreme Court decided thirty-seven cases involving the Employee Retirement
Income Securities Act of 1974, a statute of comparable range and complexity but generating far fewer
cases filed.”).
32. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2014).
33. The Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4).
34. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 ; see also id. § 2510(17).
35. Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression Remedy Would
Change Computer Crime Law, 54 Hastings L.J. 805, 815 (2003).
36. Pen Register Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127.
37. ECPA Reform Committee, supra note 15, Ex. B.
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38

devices only demand “certified relevance”; (2) stored communications
39
and account records require at least “specific and articulable facts”; (3)
40
tracking device warrants require a Rule 41 “probable cause” standard;
41
42
and (4) wiretap orders require a “super-warrant” standard. In
determining whether information is protected from the government, courts
engage in two primary inquiries: (1) which of these four standards is
required under ECPA to obtain that specific type of information, and
(2) whether the Fourth Amendment requires a higher standard. But
without binding appellate precedent, a magistrate or district judge’s
answer to these inquiries is irrelevant outside of that specific case
because the decision is not binding on other judges.
A. The Secrecy Provisions Within ECPA Diminish Notice and
Render Targeted Individuals Unaware That the Government
Has Obtained Their Information
ECPA’s secrecy regime is a prime reason why appellate review of
ECPA applications is so scarce. Without proper notice, targeted individuals
rarely understand that the government has obtained their information,
and thus, cannot contest adverse court rulings that favor the government.
As stated by Magistrate Judge Stephen William Smith, “excessive secrecy
effectively shields electronic surveillance orders from appellate review,
thereby depriving the judiciary of its normal role in shaping, adapting,
and updating legislation to fit changing factual (and technological) settings
43
over time.” This Subpart briefly outlines the statutory authority within
the Wiretap Act and the SCA that allows the government and courts to
withhold notice from targeted individuals that they are being surveilled.
Under the Wiretap Act, wiretap orders “shall be sealed by the
44
45
judge” until a showing of “good cause.” Because no time limit is given
for how long the order will be sealed, the effect is to “close files to public
46
scrutiny long after any need for secrecy has passed.” Although the
statute requires the government to provide notice to the target after
surveillance, notice is only required after ninety days, and that period
38. 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2). The statute simply requires the court to find that the law enforcement
official has “certified to the court that the information likely to be obtained” is “relevant to an ongoing
criminal investigation.” Id. § 3123(a)(1)–(2).
39. Id. § 2703(d).
40. Id. § 3117; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(d)(1).
41. Freiwald, supra note 23, at 748.
42. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (discussing the requirements that the government must meet to
obtain a wiretap order).
43. Smith, supra note 2, at 326.
44. In re United States, 10 F.3d 931 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(b)); see also
18 U.S.C. § 2510(9)(a).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(b).
46. Smith, supra note 2, at 323 (quoting James G. Carr & Patricia L. Bellia, The Law of
Electronic Surveillance § 4:72 (2012)).
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47

may be extended if there is “good cause.” Moreover, the statute has no
notice requirement for individuals who are ancillary to the investigation,
and those individuals will rarely be notified of any surveillance against
48
them.
Under the SCA, the government can obtain court orders through
§ 2703(d) to compel access to stored wire and electronic communications,
49
as well as subscriber and customer account information. Although the
statute does not have a provision for sealing such orders, the government
is not required to provide notice to the subscriber or customer if it obtains
50
the information using a warrant. The government may obtain information
through an administrative subpoena or a § 2703(d) order if it first provides
51
notice to the individual, except that notice may be delayed indefinitely
52
in ninety-day increments if it fits one of five exceptions. The practical
effect of this secrecy scheme is that defendants can be surveilled for years
53
without receiving notice, hindering their ability to both contest the
government in the first place and appeal adverse decisions to higher
courts.
The secrecy of these proceedings has allowed issues under ECPA to
54
go relatively unexamined for years. As a result, there is almost zero
guidance on the proper scope of the law, despite the incredible number
55
of requests received by ISPs each year.
B. Even If Notified, ECPA Lacks Adequate Remedies for
Individuals to Oppose the Government Once Their Information
Has Been Obtained
Even where an individual receives notice of surveillance under ECPA,
the targeted individual has little incentive to bring a claim under the

47. Id. (“In practice, the ninety-day maximum period has come to be seen as a minimum, and
further postponements are granted as a matter of routine.”).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 324; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A).
51. Id. § 2703(b)(1)(B).
52. Id. § 2705(a)(2) (listing the exceptions as: “(A) endangering the life or physical safety of an
individual; (B) flight from prosecution; (C) destruction of or tampering with evidence; (D) intimidation
of potential witnesses; or (E) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a
trial”).
53. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 283 (6th Cir. 2010). In October 2004, the
government formally requested that the ISP preserve Warshak’s e-mails, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(f). Id. In January 2005, the government obtained a subpoena for those e-mails, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 2703(b). Id. In May 2005, the government served the ISP with an ex parte court order for any
additional e-mails, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). Id. “In all, the government compelled [the ISP] to
reveal the contents of approximately 27,000 e-mails. Warshak did not receive notice of either the
subpoena or the order until May 2006.” Id.
54. Smith, supra note 2, at 326.
55. See infra Part III.
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statute for the improper interception of their electronic communications.
As a result, targeted individuals are even less likely to oppose the
government because they are unable to remedy the situation once the
government has improperly obtained their information. And although
ECPA authorizes civil remedies, defendants are rarely willing to pursue
57
these when faced with criminal charges.
The largest obstacle targeted individuals face is that ECPA does not
provide an exclusionary remedy to suppress information in a criminal
proceeding once the government has improperly obtained the
58
information. Rather, information obtained in violation of ECPA can
only be excluded from a criminal proceeding if: (1) the court concludes
the search violated the Fourth Amendment, and (2) the court finds that
59
law enforcement officials did not act in good faith. Yet courts are often
unwilling to consider the constitutional merits if they first find that the
60
officials acted in good faith, resulting in an impressive lack of precedent.
C. The Practical Implication of ECPA’s Statutory Scheme Is That
Only a Small Percentage of ECPA Applications Are Ever
Opposed and Appealed
Only a few courts of appeals have considered the standards necessary
61
for the collection of information under ECPA. Magistrate Judge Smith’s
explanation is that none of the three parties aggrieved—the targeted

56. Freiwald, supra note 24, at 681.
57. Kerr, supra note 35. Individuals have a cause of action against the government for willful
violations and may recover the greater of actual or statutory damages, plus reasonable litigation costs.
18 U.S.C. § 2512(a). Because the majority of ECPA cases are litigated within the civil context, courts
have not elaborated on the statute’s application within the criminal context and have largely ignored
Fourth Amendment application.
58. But see id. § 2515 (prohibiting the use of improperly intercepted wire or oral communications,
or any evidence obtained resulting from it, but not prohibiting the use of electronic communications);
see also Kerr, supra note 35, at 809 (“[A suppression remedy] would clarify the law, inform the public,
and influence the law’s doctrinal development.”).
59. Freiwald, supra note 24, at 682; see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984)
(recognizing a good faith exception to the suppression of improperly obtained evidence).
60. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. Interestingly, the Supreme Court has considered a similar issue within
the realm of qualified immunity. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Qualified immunity
does not apply where (1) the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged violation of a constitutional right, and (2)
that right was “clearly established” at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct. Id. at 232.
Previously, the Court mandated that courts were required to first determine whether a constitutional
right was violated, in order to support the “law’s elaboration from case to case.” Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The goal was to allow constitutional rights to become “clearly established”
through such determinations. Id. The Court has since overturned this mandate, however, and lower
courts may avoid the constitutional merits by simply concluding that the constitutional right has not
been clearly established. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. The result is that these types of rights are rarely
further established. See id.
61. See infra Part III.B.
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individual, the ISP, or the government—has any real incentive to appeal
62
decisions.
First, the targeted individual has no opportunity to oppose an ex
63
parte motion until a court has already granted access to the government.
Because of the unique nature of electronic communications, targeted
64
individuals have no way to challenge an order before its execution.
Whereas a traditional search requires law enforcement officials to enter
the premises of the targeted individual to conduct the search, electronic
communications are generally obtained from ISPs and other third-party
65
communications companies. Moreover, ISPs are not allowed to notify
the customer or subscriber of the ECPA order for as long as the “court
66
deems appropriate.” By the time individuals obtain notice of these
requests and are able to contest them, the government has already collected
the information. Because ECPA has no suppression remedy, this essentially
67
eliminates any incentive the individual would have to appeal, assuming
the targeted individual even knows of the order used to obtain the evidence
68
in the first place.
As a rare example of when a defendant was incentivized to appeal a
lower court’s ruling, consider the case of United States v. Warshak, where
the Sixth Circuit ultimately concluded that the defendant possessed a
69
reasonable expectation of privacy in his e-mails. There, the defendant
had substantial financial incentives to appeal his case—not including
ECPA’s meager statutory remedy—because his alleged fraudulent activities
centered on his incredibly profitable company, which served as the
70
distributor of the male-enhancement drug Enzyte. Moreover, the
defendant was only able to appeal “after a magistrate judge unsealed the
underlying ECPA orders,” revealing the source of the government’s
71
evidence. But targeted individuals rarely possess the types of financial
resources available to the defendant in Warshak, and thus, defendants
are rarely in a position to appeal these cases and mount a constitutional

62. Smith, supra note 2, at 327.
63. See supra Part II.B.
64. Smith, supra note 2, at 327.
65. Kerr, supra note 35, at 808–09.
66. 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) (2006).
67. Smith, supra note 2, at 330–31.
68. The targeted individual is unlikely to even know of the order because it is submitted “ex parte,
without notice, and subject to the sealing and gag orders.” Id. at 327. The government would
additionally need to disclose the order in pretrial discovery or trial, which is unlikely given that few of
these orders are ever unsealed. Id. at 327–28.
69. 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010).
70. See id. at 318.
71. Smith, supra note 2, at 327 (citing Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 460–61 (6th Cir.
2007), vacated in part, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc), appeal after remand, 631 F.3d 266 (6th
Cir. 2010)).
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challenge whenever the government has improperly obtained their
information.
Second, ISPs have little incentive to oppose the government against
such orders: they are compensated for the costs of complying, and the
72
cost of a legal battle would far outweigh simply providing the information.
Additionally, many of those ISPs do not want to oppose the government
73
because they market identical services to the public for profit. And
because there is no binding precedent from higher courts, an ISP’s efforts
may have diminishing returns: the government can simply apply to different
74
magistrate judges until one of them grants the order. Although larger
ISPs have significant resources to oppose the government, the reality is
75
that they rarely appeal those decisions.
Finally, the government has no incentive to appeal decisions. The
government applies for these orders ex parte, so there are only two
possible outcomes: the magistrate judge will either grant or deny the
order. If the former, the government will simply collect the information
and move on. If the latter, the government will not risk an appeal that
could establish binding, unfavorable law. Instead, the government will
simply apply to another magistrate judge, as the opinion of one magistrate
76
has no binding effect on others. Neither of these outcomes encourages
the government to appeal because it either received a positive outcome
or risk the establishment of binding law against its position. Moreover,
because of the ex parte nature of these proceedings, the government is
the sole party to define the issues before the court and can guide the court’s
analysis accordingly. Looking to CSLI as an example, the government has
characterized this information as “historical,” even where the data is
77
milliseconds old and can enable contemporaneous tracking. The result
is that the government is in complete control over the ex parte proceedings
and has no incentive to appeal and create potentially adverse precedent.
This discussion highlights just one explanation for the simple fact
78
that few, if any, of these ex parte orders under ECPA are ever appealed.
Assuming charges are even filed against the targeted individual, it is not
72. Id. at 328.
73. Albert Gidari, Companies Caught in the Middle, 41 U.S.F. L. Rev. 535, 546 (2007). As a
concrete example, while a consumer may not want the government to be able to track them using their
phone, a consumer does want Apple to be able to locate their phone in case it is lost or stolen. See iPhone
Support: Find My iPhone, Apple, https://www.apple.com/support/iphone/find/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2015).
74. Gidari, supra note 73, at 546–47.
75. Smith, supra note 2, at 328; see also Gidari, supra note 73, at 550 (“How does that sit when
you are a multipurpose phone company and your general counsel is the former Attorney General of
the United States . . . ? Verizon is likely not going to see these issues the same as [privacy groups].”).
76. Gidari, supra note 73, at 547.
77. Government Reply Brief, In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of
Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010) (No. 08-4227), 2009
WL 3866620.
78. Smith, supra note 2, at 326–27.
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clear that the government discloses that the evidence was obtained from
79
an ECPA order. And even if the targeted individual was aware that the
information stemmed from an ECPA order, the impending criminal charges
overshadow any potential opposition to or appeal of the ECPA order
itself. The inevitable result is that magistrate judges are forced to respond
to thousands of these requests each year with “literally no binding
80
precedent” to guide their decisions or create uniform outcomes.

III. Lack of Appellate Precedent Under ECPA
Magistrate Judge Smith has argued that the Supreme Court’s difficulty
in clarifying ECPA standards stems from the “relative paucity of cases
81
involving electronic surveillance under ECPA.” This Part details the
inevitable outcome of ECPA’s secrecy regime: the sincere lack of both
Supreme Court and circuit court precedent under the Act.
A. The Supreme Court Has Provided No Guidance as to the
Standards Required by ECPA
The Supreme Court has only had the opportunity to consider two
82
83
cases under ECPA, neither of which was within the criminal context.
Ultimately, neither case elaborated on the standards required under ECPA
or the Fourth Amendment.
Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Supreme Court’s first case on the issue,
only considered the First Amendment implications of ECPA’s disclosure
84
requirements, and thus, it is largely irrelevant to the question of what
standards are required by ECPA or the Fourth Amendment. And while
the Supreme Court’s second decision—City of Ontario, California v.
Quon—directly addressed the standards required under ECPA, the
85
Court did not provide any guidance as to what protections might exist.
79. Id. at 327–28.
80. Nesbitt, supra note 17, at 262.
81. Id. at 261.
82. See City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010); see also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S.
514 (2001).
83. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that Fourth Amendment protections extend beyond just
criminal investigations, including when the government acts in its capacity as an employer. See, e.g.,
Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967); Treasury Emps. v. Von Raab, 656, 665 (1989). The
Court has not clarified, however, whether a different Fourth Amendment standard applies where the
government acts as an employer, as opposed to its law enforcement capacity. Quon, 560 U.S. at 757
(discussing the plurality opinion in O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987)).
84. Specifically, § 2511(1)(c) prohibited the intentional disclosure of illegally intercepted
communications. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511 (2008). The Court had to determine (1) whether this was a
“content-neutral” law of general applicability, and (2) whether application to the defendants violated
their First Amendment rights, where the defendants had obtained the information lawfully and did not
realize it had originally been obtained illegally. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 517. Ultimately the Court held
that this was a content-neutral law, but that it did violate the defendants’ First Amendment rights
because they had not taken part in the interception of the information. Id. at 526, 535.
85. 560 U.S. 746.
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There, the Court determined whether the Fourth Amendment prohibited
the city from reading a government employee’s text messages sent using
86
a pager. Although the factual record in Quon was eight years old and
the technology focused primarily on a pager, the Supreme Court—in
2010—stated that it “risk[ed] error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in
87
society has become clear.” Rather, the Court assumed arguendo that
Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text messages but
ultimately held that the search was reasonable because it was “efficient
88
and expedient” and not “excessively intrusive.” Neither Bartnicki nor
Quon elaborated on the protections under ECPA or the Fourth
Amendment.
As a result of continued ambiguity as to the standards required
under ECPA, lower courts are left to grapple with Fourth Amendment
precedent that was mostly decided in the 1970s and ‘80s. The seminal
privacy case interpreting the Fourth Amendment is Katz v. United States,
where the Supreme Court held that there was a reasonable expectation
of privacy over a telephone conversation that occurred in a phone
89
booth. The Court focused on the fact that a user of a telephone booth
shut the door, which entitled him “to assume that the words he utters
90
into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.” But the thirdparty doctrine quickly limited any reasonable expectation of privacy in
91
information revealed to third parties. For example, in Smith v.
Maryland, the Supreme Court refused to recognize an expectation of
privacy in phone numbers dialed by an individual because “[a]ll
telephone users realize that they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the
92
telephone company” in order to place calls. The Supreme Court also
distinguished between “envelope” information, such as the numbers
dialed, and “content” information, such as the actual conversation itself,
86. Id. at 750. Importantly, Mr. Quon was a police officer working for the city, and the city had
given him the pager to use for work purposes. Id. at 750–51.
87. Id. at 759. But see Freiwald, supra note 23, at 689 (“[I]f the courts take too long to address
new technology, they create the risk not only that the technology they do address will be obsolete but
also ‘that the Fourth Amendment will never really catch up.’”) (quoting Audio File: Hearing Before S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Promoting Security and
Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, at 88:30-89:10 (2010) (oral statement of Brad Smith, Esq., General
Counsel of Microsoft Corporation)), available at http://www.senate.gov/fplayers/CommPlayer/
commFlashPlayer.cfm?fn=judiciary092210&st=xxx).
88. Quon, 560 U.S. at 76061.
89. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). In order to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy, an
individual must show (1) a subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) that the expectation is “one that society
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 352; see also id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“The critical fact in this case is that
‘[o]ne who occupies it, [a telephone booth] shuts the door behind him . . . .”).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (holding that a bank customer lost
any expectation of privacy when she gave her information to a bank teller).
92. 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
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93

which might have been entitled to more protections. While these factual
examples may appear simple, scholars remain conflicted as to how
applicable these “pre-modern precedents” are to the “constitutional
94
minimums for modern communications.”
Two recent Supreme Court cases have cast doubt on the continued
applicability of these older cases to modern Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. In United States v. Jones, where the Court unanimously
held that the government’s warrantless installation of a GPS tracking
device violated the Fourth Amendment, five Justices expressed doubts
about the applicability of the third-party doctrine in more modern
95
cases. The five-Justice majority reached its conclusion by relying on the
government’s physical trespass on the defendant’s car to place a GPS and
96
track the defendant. While agreeing with the majority in this case,
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence directly questioned the relevance of
97
older legal frameworks, such as the third-party doctrine, for future cases.
Moreover, Justice Alito’s four-Justice concurrence criticized the majority’s
trespass theory and directly applied the Katz test to conclude that GPS
tracking for four weeks violated the defendant’s reasonable expectation
98
of privacy. Thus, at least five Justices have expressed a willingness to
discard the third-party doctrine as it applies to modern technologies.
Similarly, the second case—Riley v. California—distinguished Smith
and rejected the government’s argument that the third-party doctrine
should apply. There, the Court unanimously held that the Fourth
Amendment required police officers to obtain a warrant to search a
99
defendant’s cell phone for incriminating information. In reaching its
decision, the Court rejected third-party doctrine because the use of a pen

93. Id. at 743. But see id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“The numbers dialed from a private
telephone—although certainly more prosaic than the conversation itself—are not without ‘content.’”);
see also Freiwald, supra note 23, at 689 (labeling the content versus non-content interpretation as an
“analytical short cut” that inhibits Fourth Amendment analysis).
94. Compare Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 Stan. Tech. L.
Rev. 3, 12 (2007) (arguing that courts should instead apply a “normative inquiry” of “whether users
may rely on the privacy of the information because of the vital nature of that aspect of modern
communications”), with Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother
That Isn’t, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 607, 612 (2003) (arguing that the principles of Katz and Smith translate
well to e-mail, which easily distinguishes between e-mail headers and the body of the e-mail).
95. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2012) (applying a trespass-based theory to render
the GPS device unconstitutional because the GPS device was placed on the bottom of the defendant’s
vehicle).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed
to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.” (citations
omitted)).
98. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
99. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014).
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register in Smith did not qualify as a “search” under the Fourth
100
Amendment. Thus, it is even less clear what Fourth Amendment standard
should guide lower courts as they wrestle with the privacy protections of
electronic communications, other than the normative, case-by-case inquiry
101
provided by Katz.
B. Only a Handful of Circuit Court Decisions Have Grappled
with These Standards Required Under ECPA
Appellate interpretations of the standards required to obtain
electronic communications have been relatively sparse as well. In recent
years, the discussion of location data has received relatively greater
discussion than other technologies that focus exclusively on electronic
communications. For example, only one appellate court has addressed
whether citizens enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
102
e-mail, ultimately concluding that they do. By contrast, several circuits
103
had previously issued opinions discussing GPS location data before the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Jones resolved the issue by requiring a
104
warrant.
There are three possible explanations for the disparate treatment of
these types of information. The first is that location data, unlike electronic
communications, often goes directly to a central element in a crime (that
is, the defendant’s whereabouts), and thus, the government is more likely
to rely on this information at trial. Another possible explanation is that
the government can plausibly claim that electronic communications were
obtained in some way other than through ECPA or the SCA, such as by
searching a defendant’s computer after arrest. By contrast, the government
will often need to detail the reliability of the defendant’s location data,
including how it was obtained, in order to persuade a jury in a criminal
case. One final explanation is that GPS location data, one of the most
105
popular forms of tracking until Jones, is not subject to ECPA and the

100. Id. at 2492. The logical conclusion of this analysis is that any “search” of a defendant’s information
would never be subject to the third-party doctrine. See id.
101. Freiwald, supra note 94; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (requiring an individual to show (1) a subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) that the
expectation is “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”).
102. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 631 F. 3d 266, 275, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that individuals
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails when the ISP merely acted as an intermediary to
facilitate their transmission).
103. United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2011) cert. granted and judgment
vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1534 (2012); United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 568 (D.C. Cir. 2010) aff’d in
part sub nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945; United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir.
2010) cert. granted and judgment vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1533 (2012).
104. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (affirming that the government’s warrantless installation of a GPS
tracking device violated the Fourth Amendment).
105. GPS location data is not generally governed by ECPA because it relies on a tracking device,
and not necessarily electronic communications stored by an ISP. See id. at 949; see also In re
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corresponding secrecy regime that diminishes appellate review. Regardless
of the ultimate reason, the reality is that appellant precedent under ECPA
remains scarce.
Now that the Supreme Court has held that GPS surveillance requires
106
a warrant, warrantless cell phone tracking has become a de facto method
107
to snoop on criminals. As a result, this is one of the few technologies
governed by ECPA that has received at least moderate appellate attention
in the past few years. By way of background, law enforcement officials
perform this cell phone tracking by monitoring CSLI, defined as
108
information about calls made using cell sites or cell towers. CSLI will
reflect the direction of the user from the tower and will normally connect
to the closest cell tower, allowing law enforcement to extrapolate the
approximate location of the cell phone user at the time and date of the
109
call record. Only three appellate courts have considered SCA and
110
Fourth Amendment standards for obtaining cell site information.
Moreover, each of these circuits have articulated different standards
required under ECPA to obtain a defendant’s cell site information.
The Third Circuit did not address the legal standard for cell site
111
information until 2010. In In re Application of the U.S. for an Order
Directing a Provider of Electronic Communication Service to Disclose
Records to the Government, the Third Circuit rejected the argument that
historical cell site information constituted a “tracking device,” which
would have required a probable cause standard, largely because “the
privacy interests at issue are confined to the interior of the home” and
there was no evidence that historical cell site information “extend[ed] to
112
that realm.” Thus, the court concluded that a § 2703(d) order only
Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 830 F. Supp. 2d 114, 133 n.15
(“Again, the Court sees little resemblance between the tracking devices in [GPS location cases] and
the retrieval of stored electronic records here.”).
106. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 95 (affirming that the government’s warrantless installation of a GPS
tracking device violated the Fourth Amendment).
107. David Kravets, NSA Wrongly Says Warrantless Mobile-Phone Location Tracking is Legal,
Wired (Dec. 6, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2013/12/nsa-cell-site-data/.
108. See United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1210–11 (11th Cir. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part
en banc, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015).
109. Id. at 1211.
110. See id.; see also In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n
Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that the government
is only required to show “specific and articulable facts” that historical cell site data is reasonably related
to an ongoing criminal investigation, but that a magistrate judge has discretion to require a warrant
and probable cause); In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th
Cir. 2013) (holding that there was not a reasonable expectation of privacy in regards to historical cell
site data because the information sought was a business record and voluntarily given to a third party).
111. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to
Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d at 313.
112. Id. at 312–13 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) and United States v. Karo,
468 U.S. 705 (1984) for the proposition that “tracking devices” only implicate Fourth Amendment
concerns to the extent they “reveal a critical fact about the interior” of the home).
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required “specific and articulable facts” that the information was “relevant
113
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” The Third Circuit
proceeded, however, to hold that a magistrate judge possesses discretion
to require a warrant showing probable cause pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
114
§ 2703(c)(1)(A), so long as she made “fact findings and [gave] a full
explanation that balances the Government’s need (not merely desire) for
115
the information with the privacy interests of cell phone users.”
The Fifth Circuit agreed that § 2703(d) only required the “specific
and articulable facts” standard, but disagreed that a magistrate judge
possessed discretion to require a probable cause warrant under the
116
SCA. Although the Eleventh Circuit ultimately agreed with the Fifth
Circuit in the en banc decision United States v. Davis, a panel decision in
117
the same case merits additional discussion.
The panel ultimately disagreed with both the Third and Fifth
Circuits and held that the Fourth Amendment required the government to
118
produce probable cause to obtain a defendant’s cell site information. The
Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones,
arguing that the factual differences between GPS location data and cell
site information actually “operate[d] against the government’s case
119
rather than in favor of it.” Jones involved the movements of a
defendant’s automobile in public, and the Supreme Court ultimately
concluded that a “reasonable expectation of privacy had been
established by the aggregation of the points of data, not by the obtaining
120
of individual points.” The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that this “mosaic
theory” was unnecessary to establish an expectation of privacy in cell site
information, where one’s cell phone “can accompany its owner anywhere”
121
and automatically convert “a private event into a public one.” Thus,
while GPS location data would only be protected in the aggregate, the
court held that “even one point” of cell site information could be within
113. Id. at 313.
114. Section 2703(c)(1) of the SCA states that “a governmental entity may require a provider of
electronic communication service or remote computing service to disclose a record . . . when the
governmental entity (A) obtains a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure . . .” or “(B) obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of
this section[.]” 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703 (emphasis added).
115. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to
Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d at 319.
116. In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 607 (“[W]e conclude
that the ‘may be issued’ language is permissive—it grants a court the authority to issue the order—and
the ‘shall issue’ term directs the court to issue the order if all the necessary conditions in the statute are
met.”).
117. See United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc,
785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1215.
120. Id. (discussing United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2012)).
121. Id. at 1215–16.
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122

a reasonable expectation of privacy. Notably, the en banc majority of
the Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on the third party doctrine to reverse
the panel’s decision, despite more recent Supreme Court precedent
123
casting doubt on the doctrine’s applicability to more modern technology.
These cases demonstrate that there is little guidance as to the proper
standards required under ECPA or the Fourth Amendment. While the
courts have engaged in some discussion of the standards required to
obtain a § 2703(d) order for CSLI, there is still little agreement across
124
circuits. Moreover, a court’s discussion is often technology specific and
125
rarely applies outside of the context of that specific technology. The
best way to increase appellate discussion of technology under ECPA is
for parties to increase opposition to the government and appeal adverse
judgments.

IV. The Solution: Increasing ECPA Appeals to Create
Binding Precedent
Ex parte proceedings already go against our adversarial judicial
structure in that they allow one party to petition the court without
126
opposition from another party. There are three avenues to increase
appellate review of ex parte ECPA orders and foster the development of
binding standards under the Act. First, given the political climate
surrounding developments in privacy law after the Snowden revelations
of 2013, ISPs should be more willing to oppose government requests for
information. Second, district courts should be willing to appoint counsel
in federal criminal cases where it would be appropriate to do so. And
third, Congress could amend ECPA to allow courts to appoint
Constitutional Advocates in cases where significant constitutional questions
are presented, reinstating the adversarial nature of these proceedings.

122. Id. at 1216.
123. See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511–15 (11th Cir. 2015) (“If anything, Justice Alito’s
concurrence, joined by three others, suggests that a legislative solution is needed.”); see also supra
Part III.A (discussing the Supreme Court’s more recent disregard of the third party doctrine).
124. Compare Davis, 754 F.3d at 1217, with In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site
Data, 724 F.3d at 607.
125. See Davis, 754 F.3d at 1215 (accepting as relevant the government’s distinction between GPS
location data and cell site information); see also In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to
§ 18 U.S.C. 2703(d), 830 F. Supp. 2d 114, 133 n.15 (“Again, the Court sees little resemblance between
the tracking devices in [GPS location cases] and the retrieval of stored electronic records here.”).
126. Nesbitt, supra note 17, at 262 (“[T]he ex parte nature of ECPA applications does present a
major procedural challenge for magistrate judges. These are not adversary proceedings with opposing
counsel present to argue the constitutional, statutory, or procedural rights of . . . other targeted
parties.”).
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A. ISPs Should Increase Opposition to the Government and Appeal
Cases
ISPs do not want to be “middle men” between citizens and the
127
government, but there is no realistic alternative under a statutory
scheme that requires ISPs to track customer information in order to
128
provide it to the government. If ISPs opposed the government’s ECPA
orders and appealed adverse decisions to higher courts, then appellate
courts would be able to establish binding precedent that would guide
lower courts as to the proper legal process required under ECPA and the
Fourth Amendment. With that guiding precedent, the focus can turn
away from ISPs and toward the appropriate standard that should be
applied to a particular technology.
1.

The NSA Revelations Provide Background as to Why ISPs Have
Recently Pushed for Legislative Reform

The Internet industry’s push for privacy reform is an overt reaction
to the Snowden revelations of 2013, which accused many of these same
technology companies of directly enabling the mass surveillance of
129
American citizens without a warrant. Two specific programs are directly
130
relevant to large communications companies: MUSCULAR and PRISM.
MUSCULAR was a joint operation between the NSA and its
British counterpart, the Government Communications Headquarters
131
(“GCHQ”). The operation performed “upstream collection,” which
132
refers to the direct copying of entire data flows over fiber-optic cables.
Using this type of collection, the NSA copied any and all information
133
sent between Google and Yahoo! datacenters across the world without
134
the companies’ knowledge.
127. Gidari, supra note 73, at 535 (“I do not tend to think about it that way—being ‘in the
middle’—I think it is just way too polite a term, way too generic, under-descriptive, and underinformed. Instead, I think ‘Service Providers As Piñatas’ would be a better title because service
providers get beat up by all sides all the time.”).
128. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) (2006) (requiring ISPs to preserve records pending the issuance of a
court order); see also Interview with Eric Schmidt, supra note 22 (discussing how Google stored
information longer than otherwise necessary to provide it to the government for these types of requests).
129. NSA Slides Explain the PRISM Data-Collection Program, Wash. Post (last updated July 10,
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/ [hereinafter
Prism Slides] (identifying Microsoft, Google, Yahoo!, Facebook, PalTalk, YouTube, Skype, AOL, and
Apple as providers for the NSA’s PRISM program).
130. Id.; see also Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data
Centers Worldwide, Snowden Documents Say, Wash. Post (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documentssay/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html.
131. See Prism Slides, supra note 129.
132. Id.
133. Google and Yahoo! each have since encrypted the data sent between data centers, so as to
make it more difficult for the NSA to make widespread use of the data. Matthew Panzarino, Yahoo
Will Follow Google in Encrypting Data Center Traffic, Customer Data Flow by Q1’14, TechCrunch
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By contrast, PRISM allowed the NSA to collect information from
participating companies based on “targeting selectors,” so long as there was
135
a “reasonable belief” that the specified target was a “foreign national
136
who is overseas at the time.” Depending on the provider, the NSA
received e-mail, chat (video and voice), videos, photos, stored data,
Voice over Internet Protocol (“VoIP”), file transfers, video conferencing,
notifications of the targets activity (for example, logins), and online
137
social networking details. A heavily redacted Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (“FISC”) ruling from October 2011 at least confirms
the existence of “the targeting of non-United States persons reasonably
138
believed to be located outside the United States” and “Upstream
139
Collection,” the latter of which was declared unconstitutional in that
140
same FISC ruling.
Meanwhile many of these companies have been vehemently
outspoken that they only provide information to the government if it is a
(Nov. 18, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/11/18/yahoo-will-follow-google-in-encrypting-data-centertraffic-all-traffic-between-company-and-customers-by-q1-14/. While the NSA can presumably still
copy the information, the agency would need to conduct targeted decryption in order to access the
data, which is far less effective than opportunistic decryption.
134. Gellman & Soltani, supra note 130. In response to the revelation of this program, Google’s chief
legal officer said, “We are outraged at the lengths to which the government seems to have gone to
intercept data from our private networks, and it underscores the need for urgent reform.” Id. It would be
difficult to believe that Google or Yahoo! were completely unaware that this could happen on their
servers, as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) had initiated a legal battle as early as 2006 over
the same type of surveillance on AT&T systems. Declaration of Mark Klein, 4–7, Hepting v. AT&T
Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D.C.A. 2006), available at https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/att/
Mark%20Klein%20Unredacted%20Decl-Including%20Exhibits.PDF (detailing the installation of a fiberoptic splitter to enable to duplication of all data packets sent across the cable). Although in that instance,
AT&T voluntarily cooperated with the government. Id.
135. “Reasonable belief” is defined as a fifty-one percent confidence. See Prism Slides, supra note
129.
136. Id. According to these internal slides, the following technology companies were complicit with
PRISM surveillance: Microsoft, Yahoo!, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, YouTube, Skype, AOL, and Apple. Id.
Moreover, the NSA’s General Counsel, Rajesh De, stated that Silicon Valley’s tech giants knew about both
“the internet collection program known as Prism and for the so-called ‘upstream’ collection of
communications across the internet.” DJ Pangburn, Tech Giants Knew About Prism All Along, the NSA’s
Top Lawyer Says, Vice (Mar. 19, 2014, 4:15 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/tech-giants-knew-aboutprism-all-along-says-the-nsas-top-lawyer.
137. Pangburn, supra note 136.
138. Presumably, the court’s discussion of the targeting of non-U.S. persons refers to the targeting
selectors used within PRISM. See Prism Slides, supra note 129.
139. The court’s discussion of upstream collection refers to Project MUSCULAR. See id.
140. [Redacted], 2011 WL 10945618, at *1, *28 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011). It is difficult to estimate
the current state of Project MUSCULAR, as the court’s holding left open the possibility that the
government could more narrowly tailor the “Upstream Collection.” Id. at *28. Moreover, it is unclear
whether GCHQ was involved at the time, whether the NSA avoided the constitutional concerns by
simply having GCHQ perform this collection, or whether subsequent secret decisions have overturned
this ruling. Id. What is clear is that the government received at least eight approvals of this program
until it “clarified” the proper scope of its surveillance. Id. at *11 (“The Court now understands, however,
that NSA has acquired, is acquiring, and, if the certifications and procedures now before the Court are
approved, will continue to acquire, tens of thousands of wholly domestic communications.”).
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“lawful, specific order[] about individuals” that is consistent with “tech
company lawyers scrutinizing each [PRISM] request before complying
141
with it.” For example, Google has claimed that it requires “an ECPA
142
search warrant” before divulging the content of subscribers’ information,
but this is problematic for two reasons. First, Google’s resistance only
applies to “content” information and accepts the government’s outdated
143
distinction of content and non-content data. Google still readily divulges
144
“non-content” information, which alone can reveal significant personal
145
information of targeted individuals. In fact, using just your name and
zip code—both of which are routinely included in account non-content
146
information —private companies have advertised the ability to identify
147
customers with one hundred percent accuracy. Second, it is unclear
what an “ECPA search warrant” is or the proper legal standard required
148
to obtain it. Alone, these measures are not enough to oppose the
government’s over-invasive surveillance techniques.

141. Timothy B. Lee, Here’s Everything We Know About PRISM to Date, Wash. Post Wonkblog
(June 12, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/06/12/heres-everything-weknow-about-prism-to-date/ (responding to denials made by Google Chief Architect, Yonatan Zunger,
on his public Google Plus page).
142. David Kravets, Google Tells Cops to Get Warrants for User E-Mail, Cloud Data, Wired (Jan. 23,
2013, 5:29 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/01/google-says-get-a-warrant.
143. See Smith v. Holder, 442 U.S. 735, 737, 741 (1979) (rejecting a Fourth Amendment challenge
to the use of a pen register on telephone company equipment that captured information concerning
telephone calls, but not the content or identities of the parties). But see Freiwald, supra note 23, at 689
(labeling the content versus non-content interpretation as an “analytical short cut” that inhibits Fourth
Amendment analysis).
144. For example, Google will hand over the IP addresses associated with a particular e-mail, as
well as the “non-content” portions, such as the “from,” “to,” and “date” fields. Freiwald, supra note 23, at
689.
145. Researchers sourced 5000 phone numbers and were able to identify 27.1% of those numbers
using one automated program and three publicly available directories: Yelp, Google Places, and Facebook.
Gregory Ferenstein, Stanford Researcher Proves NSA Can Probably Identify Individuals From Phone
Records, TechCrunch (Dec. 25, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/12/25/stanford-researcher-provesnsa-can-probably-identify-individuals-from-phone-records/. To conservatively approximate human analysis,
the researchers randomly sampled one hundred numbers and were able to associate sixty of the numbers
with an individual or business in just an hour using Google alone. Id.
146. For example, Microsoft has disclosed that its non-content information includes a user’s login,
personal user ID, first and last name, state, zip code, country, time zone, registered IP address, date of
registration, gender, and last login IP address. Law Enforcement Requests Report, Microsoft,
http://www.microsoft.com/about/corporatecitizenship/en-us/reporting/transparency/ (last visited Aug.
5, 2015).
147. Adam Tanner, Never Give Stores Your ZIP Code. Here’s Why, Forbes (June 19, 2013, 8:19
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamtanner/2013/06/19/theres-a-billion-reasons-not-to-give-storesyour-zip-code-ever/.
148. ECPA Reform Committee, supra note 15, n.1, Ex. B. Essentially, ECPA demands four standards,
each increasing in scrutiny based upon how invasive the order is: (1) pen registers and trap and trace
devices only demand “certified relevance”; (2) stored communications and account records at least
require “specific and articulable facts”; (3) tracking device warrants require a “probable cause”
standard of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; and (4) wiretap orders require a
“super-warrant” standard. Id. Thus, it is unclear what Google is specifically referring to when it
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The Same Rationale Underlying ISPs’ Recent Political
Opposition to the Government Supports Increased Judicial
Opposition

ISPs have the direct power to enable judicial review of ex parte
ECPA orders by simply resisting the government’s request for consumer
information and appealing cases that are decided in favor of the
government. It is especially strange, then, that many companies with this
appellate right have chosen instead to petition the legislative and executive
149
branches to reform ECPA directly.
For example, in January 2013, Google, AT&T, and other technology
companies “urged Congress to clarify when they need to give the
150
government access” to user communications. Similarly, in December of
that year, Google actively supported an online petition for the Obama
Administration to support ECPA reform, which reached the requisite
151
100,000 signatures to “mandate” an official response. While making
these public complaints to the government, technology companies have
continued to enable governmental surveillance of American citizens.
Google, Microsoft, Yahoo!, LinkedIn, and Facebook dropped a lawsuit
seeking increased transparency about government requests for consumer
information in exchange for the NSA’s permission to disclose FISA orders
152
in increments of 1000. These “first world responses” pale to the direct

requires an “ECPA search warrant,” as this could be a wiretap “super-warrant,” a traditional search
warrant, or simply a § 2703(d) order.
149. Allison Grande, Google, Others Breathe New Life Into ECPA Reform, Law360 (Jan. 29, 2013,
10:10 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/410977/google-others-breathe-new-life-into-ecpa-reform.
150. Id.
151. The administration has yet to respond. Tim Cushing, ECPA Reform Petition Passes 100K
Signature Threshold with a Last-Minute Surge, Techdirt (Dec. 12, 2013, 2:02 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20131212/08533525546/ecpa-reform-petition-passes-100k-signature-threshold-with-last-minutesurge.html; see also Letter to President Barack H. Obama, Email Privacy and Reform of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) (Apr. 28, 2014), available at https://www.aclu.org/
files/assets/ecpa_reform_coalition_letter.pdf (listing eighty-one organizations that support reforming
ECPA to require a warrant based on probable cause).
152. Jeremy Hsu, Tech Giants’ NSA Deal Leaves Start-Ups in the Shadows, Inst. for Electrical &
Electronics Engineers (Jan. 29, 2014, 5:49 PM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/telecom/internet/techgiants-nsa-deal-leaves-startups-in-the-shadows (discussing how the agreement still eliminates disclosures
from new services that are less than two years old). ISPs want to disclose more information to the public for
two reasons: (1) to create public awareness as to the extent of governmental surveillance, and (2) to
shift the blame off of these companies (for complying with the government) to the government itself (for
mandating their compliance in the first place). See AT&T Transparency Report, AT&T, http://about.att.com/
content/dam/csr/transpreport/ATT_Transparency%20Report.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2015); Verizon
Transparency Report, Verizon, http://publicpolicy.verizon.com/blog/entry/verizon-releases-transparencyreport-for-second-half-2014 (last visited Aug. 5, 2015); Jeremy Kessel, Fighting for More
#Transparency, Twitter (Feb. 6, 2014), https://blog.twitter.com/2014/fighting-for-more-transparency
(“Unfortunately, we are currently prohibited from providing this level of transparency . . .
[T]ransparency is critical for building and maintaining user trust and trust from the larger public, and
for fostering a healthy and vibrant global community committed to defending free expression.”).
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measures that these companies could take by opposing ex parte ECPA
applications directly and appealing adverse decisions.
Not all technology companies have decided to play ball with the
Obama Administration or respond to government requests for information.
For example, Twitter filed a lawsuit to increase transparency about
153
government requests for consumer information. Similarly, a small privacyfocused company, Lavabit, unsuccessfully resisted the government’s
request for its encryption keys, arguing that the keys would grant the
154
government access to all of Lavabit’s 400,000 customers. After Lavabit’s
lawsuit was unsuccessful, another privacy-focused start-up, Silent Circle,
closed its e-mail operations rather than be forced to comply with future
155
government requests for information. These companies exemplify the
lengths to which ISPs could go to oppose the government’s request for
consumer information.
Other companies have followed suit and actually removed the
technological capability for the government to access user information.
For example, Apple made headlines when it announced that it would no
156
longer enable its phones to remotely obtain customer data. Within
three hours of Apple’s announcement, Google followed suit and announced
157
that they would similarly encrypt their future phones. Law enforcement
officials were highly critical of these decisions, arguing that the protective
measures would hinder investigators even where they possessed probable

153. Ellen Nakashima, Twitter Sues U.S. Government Over Limits on Ability to Disclose Surveillance
Orders, Wash. Post (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/twitter-suesus-government-over-limits-on-ability-to-disclose-surveillance-orders/2014/10/07/5cc39ba0-4dd4-11e4babe-e91da079cb8a_story.html.
154. In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 281 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Ladar Levison, Secrets, Lies and
Snowden’s Email: Why I Was Forced to Shut Down Lavabit, Guardian (May 20, 2014, 7:30 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/20/why-did-lavabit-shut-down-snowden-email.
The government also refused Levison’s offer to modify the code of his servers so that the government
could use the encryption key without accessing all 400,000 of Lavabit’s customers. Id. The government’s
request was issued shortly after Snowden first revealed the NSA’s campaign of warrantless surveillance, and
commentators have heavily speculated that the government sought access to Snowden’s actual e-mail
address. Glenn Greenwald, Email Service Used by Snowden Shuts Itself Down, Warns Against Using
US-Based Companies, Guardian (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/09/
lavabit-shutdown-snowden-silicon-valley.
155. Parmy Olson, Encryption App Silent Circle Shuts Down E-Mail Service ‘To Prevent Spying’,
Forbes (Aug. 9, 2013, 12:41 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2013/08/09/encryption-appsilent-circle-shuts-down-e-mail-service-to-prevent-spying/ (discussing how “Silent Circle” preemptively shut
down its e-mail application after Lavabit’s legal troubles).
156. Privacy, Apple, http://www.apple.com/privacy/government-information-requests/ (last visited
Aug. 5, 2015) (“So it’s not technically feasible for us to respond to government warrants for the
extraction of this data from devices in their possession running iOS 8.”).
157. Craig Timberg, Newest Androids Will Join iPhones in Offering Default Encryption, Blocking Police,
Wash. Post (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/09/18/newestandroids-will-join-iphones-in-offering-default-encryption-blocking-police/.
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158

cause to properly conduct the search. But given the uncertain standards
behind these types of warrants and the government’s relentless pursuit of
security at the cost of privacy, this is just one example of the new Internet
regime, by which the Internet industry actively opposes the government
159
intelligence community, rather than working with them.
The development of the standards required under ECPA also cuts
in favor of law enforcement. When technology companies feel backed
into a corner, they have demonstrated a willingness to completely remove
160
the government’s ability to obtain this information in the first place.
Rather than eliminating access to customer information altogether, the
government should favor the development of clear precedent that allows
prosecutors, ISPs, and users to understand what is necessary to obtain
customer information.
The same reasons that justify ISPs in politically opposing the
government also support ISPs opposing the government in the courts.
The most direct way to change the standards required under ECPA—
short of congressional intervention—is to appeal to the courts and
develop binding law that endorses more stringent protections of user
information. If these companies truly want reform, of both online privacy
law and their own reputations, then they should actively oppose the
government to create binding precedent under ECPA. If ISPs continue
to remain complicit with government surveillance, however, then courts
should look to other ways to encourage an adversarial system and create
binding precedent.
B. Judges Can Appoint Counsel in Situations Where the Interests
of Justice so Require
Judges are responsible for appointing counsel in federal criminal
161
cases when defendants are unable to pay for representation. Prior to
1964, judges had to rely on the “professional obligation of lawyers” to
162
provide pro bono representation to such defendants. In order to
establish a structured and comprehensive system for appointing and

158. Mike Masnick, Law Enforcement Freaks Out Over Apple & Google’s Decision To Encrypt Phone
Info By Default, Techdirt (Sept. 23, 2014, 11:18 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140923/07120428605/
law-enforcement-freaks-out-over-apple-googles-decision-to-encrypt-phone-info-default.shtml.
159. Mike Masnick, Thank Snowden: Internet Industry Now Considers the Intelligence Community An
Adversary, Not A Partner, Techdirt (Feb. 13, 2015, 10:30 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150213/
07100730015/thank-snowden-internet-industry-now-considers-intelligence-community-adversary-notpartner.shtml.
160. See Masnick, supra note 158.
161. Appointment
of
Counsel,
U.S.
Courts,
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/
AppointmentOfCounsel.aspx (last visited Aug. 5, 2015).
162. Id.
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compensating lawyers in these cases, Congress enacted the Criminal
163
Justice Act (“CJA”).
The CJA states that if magistrate judges determine that the
“interests of justice so require,” they may appoint counsel for any
“financially eligible person” who “is charged with a Class B or C
misdemeanor, or an infraction for which a sentence to confinement is
164
authorized.” A “financially eligible person” is defined as someone
whose “net financial resources and income are insufficient to obtain
165
qualified counsel.” In making such a determination, courts should resolve
“any doubt” in that individual’s favor, and erroneous determinations can
166
be corrected after the fact.
At least one magistrate judge has interpreted this language within
the context of ex parte ECPA orders to grant authority to appoint CJA
counsel for unnamed defendants, so as to provide a proper adversarial
167
system. That court decided to appoint CJA counsel—with government
consent—for two reasons: (1) the standard to be applied in granting
access to real time or prospective cell site information was an unsettled
legal issue, and (2) that legal issue would continue to arise “each time the
168
government submits an ex parte application for cell site information.”
The court ultimately held that the government was not entitled to the
sought data, but that the court would issue a warrant for “real time cell
169
location information” if the government could show probable cause.
170
Likely for the reasons discussed above, the government did not appeal.
Unfortunately, the court did not elaborate on its precise
171
interpretation of how the CJA allowed it to appoint counsel. One
explanation is that the CJA creates a presumption that counsel may be
172
appointed. Because of the ex parte nature of the proceeding, the court
was unable to inquire into the defendant’s financial status to determine if
173
she was “financially eligible” for CJA appointment of counsel. But the
CJA requires “any doubts” as to the defendant’s finances to be resolved

163. Id.
164. 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A)(a)(2)(A) (2006).
165. Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures, Volume VIIA, Chapter II, § 210.40.30(a),
Standards for Eligibility (2015).
166. Id.
167. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen
Register, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211, 212 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2006) [hereinafter In re Pen Register].
168. Order at 1–2, In re Pen Register, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211 (No. 06-MJ-506).
169. In re Pen Register, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 219.
170. See supra Part II.C.
171. Order at 1, In re Pen Register, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211(No. 06-MJ-506).
172. Id. (considering the “interests of justice”); see also Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures,
Volume VIIA, Chapter II, § 210.40.30(b) (“Any doubts as to a person's eligibility should be resolved
in the person's favor; erroneous determinations of eligibility may be corrected at a later time.”).
173. In re Pen Register, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211.
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174

in favor of the defendant. The court, therefore, was able to appoint
counsel in this special circumstance. Although the court took the
additional step of obtaining the government’s consent to appoint counsel,
this step was likely nothing more than the court’s attempt to eliminate a
possible future objection, not a requirement before appointing CJA counsel
175
in the first place. Congress should consider updating the language of
176
ECPA to explicitly allow or deny CJA appointments in such cases.
Until Congress explicitly resolves the matter, other judges should
consider appointing CJA counsel to oppose the government in similar ex
parte ECPA proceedings, when the interests of justice so require. In In re
Pen Register, the court only appointed counsel after seven magistrate
177
judges had already considered the issue with conflicting outcomes.
Moreover, the court took action because it expected the issue to continue
to arise each time the government applied for one of these ex parte ECPA
178
orders until a binding decision could be reached. The goal of this
appointment was not to eliminate such ex parte proceedings altogether,
but rather it was to provide a proper adversarial relationship to consider
179
the issue. Thus, there should be no concern that the limited use of CJA
appointments in these types of cases would swallow the rule.
The appointment of CJA counsel would remedy the main deficiency
under ECPA, which is that targeted individuals do not receive notice of
the government’s ECPA application until it is too late to properly oppose it.
CJA counsel would be able to oppose the government at the relevant
time—before the application is granted—and would possess the
procedural tools necessary to develop the law, including the right to
appeal an adverse decision. More judges should consider appointing CJA
counsel as a helpful solution to deal with recurring issues under ECPA.
C. Congress Could Allow Courts to Appoint a Constitutional
Advocate to Oppose the Government in Significant Cases
Within the context of FISA, members of the Senate Intelligence
Committee recommended amending the Act to allow for the appointment
174. Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures, Volume VIIA, Chapter II, § 210.40.30(b).
175. Nothing in the CJA refers to the government’s consent to appoint counsel, and there would
likely be a conflict of interest if courts relied on the government when appointing counsel to oppose it.
176. Such an amendment is highly unlikely, given Congress’ refusal to update the statutory scheme
of ECPA. See Smith, supra note 17, at 259 (“Like an absentee landlord, Congress has all but ignored
this widening breach since [geolocation monitoring] first came to its attention in 1994.”).
177. In re Pen Register, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 212 (noting that at least seven prior decisions had
considered the issue, of which five courts had rejected the government’s request for real time cell site
data and two courts had granted access to it).
178. Order at 1, In re Pen Register, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211(No. 06-MJ-506).
179. In re Pen Register, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 212–13. With the consent of the government, a “fictional”
version of the government’s application was used to ground the dispute. Id. at 213 n.2. This fictional
application retained identical legal issues to the real application, and, presumably, it was only meant to
avoid concerns about improperly notifying the targeted individual. Id.
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of a Constitutional Advocate to oppose the government in secret
180
proceedings before FISC. Congress should consider establishing a
similar Constitutional Advocate under ECPA who would be able to
oppose the government and appeal adverse decisions.
Senator Patrick Leahy’s proposal for a Constitutional Advocate
under FISA ultimately produced the USA FREEDOM Act, which the
House of Representatives passed in an attempt to reform portions of
181
FISA in light of the Snowden revelations of 2013. Although the bill was
ultimately voted down in the Senate, it required FISA Courts to appoint
an amicus curiae when, “in the opinion” of the court, the government
182
request raised a “novel or significant interpretation of the law.” Had it
passed, the USA FREEDOM Act would have certainly been at least one
incremental step closer to the proper development of the law under
FISA.
Critics of the USA FREEDOM Act, however, argued that it did not
go far enough to enable adversarial opposition to the government in
cases under FISA. For example, Judge James G. Carr argued that “an
amicus participates solely for the court’s benefit” and that the only way
to achieve true reform was to appoint an attorney to represent the target
183
directly. His primary rationale was that “[u]nlike an amicus, an
attorney would have standing on behalf of the target to appeal to the
184
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review.” These procedural
difficulties are precisely why Senator Leahy’s original proposal sought a
Constitutional Advocate, and not simply the appointment of an amicus
curiae.
The same problems outlined by critics under the USA FREEDOM
Act already exist under ECPA’s current statutory scheme. As is, courts
have the discretion to invite amicus curiae to oppose the government in
185
cases where they would like to hear additional arguments. But there
are many procedural hurdles that restrict these amici from truly opposing
the government: amici cannot pursue discovery, access sealed filings, or
186
raise claims that are not asserted by the parties. Most importantly,
187
amici cannot appeal when the court rules against them.
180. Senators Mark Udall, Ron Wyden, Richard Blumenthal, and Rand Paul introduced the
legislation. Intelligence Oversight and Surveillance Reform Act, S.1551, 113th Cong. (2013).
181. USA FREEDOM Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. (2014).
182. Id.
183. James G. Carr, Fixing What Ails the FISA, Hill (July 24, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://thehill.com/
blogs/congress-blog/judicial/213137-fixing-what-ails-the-fisa.
184. Id. Judge Carr also argued that if Congress was unwilling to authorize counsel before FISA
courts, then it should instead consider an alternative procedure that would enable an amicus to certify
questions for FISCR review. Id.
185. See Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A Fine
Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 27 Rev. Litig. 669, 687 (2008).
186. Smith, supra note 2, at 330.
187. Id.
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For example, in In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing
a Provider of Electronic Communication Service to Disclose Records to
the Government, the government originally claimed that it only sought
“single-tower and sector [] records,” which the government clarified did
not include GPS, “triangulation,” registration, or duration information
188
because that information was rarely available “for past time periods.”
At oral arguments, the government stated that location data would only
189
be recorded when actual calls were placed. But in fact, the precise
nature of what the government sought—that is, whether the location data
was available only when calls were placed or whether it was continuously
190
available—was at issue from the start of the ex parte proceedings.
Because the amici had no procedural rights, however, the most they
could do was argue that the Third Circuit should remand for an
191
evidentiary hearing. And when the Third Circuit’s opinion focused on
“historical cellular tower data . . . (including, without limitation, call
initiation and termination . . . call handoffs, call durations, registrations,
and connection records),” there was no way for the amici to appeal the
192
court’s holding. This example demonstrates the procedural shortfalls
193
that ultimately restrict the development of binding appellate decisions.
Although the USA FREEDOM Act was ultimately not adopted
under FISA, Congress should consider a similar amendment in the
context of ECPA to foster the development of binding precedent. A
Constitutional Advocate could oppose the government and assert the

188. Gov’t Memorandum of Law in Support of Request for Review at 25, In re Application of the
U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620
F.3d 304 (No. 08-4227) 2008 WL 4191511 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2008); Brief for the United States at 15,
In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose
Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (No. 08-4227), 2009 WL 3866620 (“No Global Positioning System
(‘GPS’) data or other more precise location information (such as ‘triangulation’ data) is contained in
the historical records pursuant to the application.”).
189. Oral Argument at 30:30-31:00, In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider
of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (No. 08-4227), available at
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/08-4227-ApplicationofUSA.wma.
190. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic Communication
Service to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 590 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2008) (noting
that cell phones will scan for the “strongest signal/best reception,” known as “registration,” which can
provide location data every seven seconds); see also Freiwald, supra note 23, at 711 (noting that carriers
often store location data to help manage their networks and facilitate location applications, and that
ISPs are not obligated to filter out this data when providing information to the government).
191. Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, et al. at 22, In re Application of the
U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620
F.3d 304 (No. 08-4227), 2009 WL 3866619.
192. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to
Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d at 308 (emphasis added). The Third Circuit’s holding was
ultimately a middle ground. Although ECPA did not mandate a warrant for all § 2703(d) orders seeking cell
site information, magistrate judges could, in their discretion, require a warrant before granting such
orders. Id. at 319.
193. See supra Part III.B.
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third-party rights of a targeted individual in cases that involve a
significant issue under ECPA. Congress would need to identify how
many of these positions would be necessary to properly oppose the
government, but the advocate would be a governmental officer who steps
in to represent the third-party interests of targeted individuals when the
court deems it appropriate, similar in this way to the appointment of a
194
A Constitutional Advocate would remedy the
public defender.
procedural shortcomings faced by amici that lack the ability to appeal
adverse decisions.
Moreover, given that the House of Representatives proposed such
an advocate in the context of FISA, Congress should be even more
willing to allow a Constitutional Advocate to oppose to the government
under ECPA. Whereas FISA deals with significant issues of national
195
security that require increased secrecy, ECPA is a general privacy
statute that applies outside of the national security context. Thus, while
increased opposition might decrease the level of secrecy surrounding
ECPA proceedings, this concern is less relevant to the ultimate purpose
of the Act.
To the extent Congress would be concerned that a Constitutional
Advocate would unduly burden ECPA’s statutory scheme, Congress
could look to two examples to narrow when courts should appoint a
Constitutional Advocate. First, Congress could simply use the House of
Representative’s own language under the USA FREEDOM Act, which
required a court to be faced with a “novel or significant interpretation of
the law” before it could invoke a Constitutional Advocate. Second,
Congress could direct courts to the same principles that prompted the
judge in In re Pen Register to appoint CJA counsel, meaning that an
unsettled legal issue would “continue to arise each time the government
196
submits an ex parte application” for that type of information. Under
either approach, the Constitutional Advocate would reinvigorate the
adversarial nature of these proceedings, where important constitutional
questions are likely to recur, without unduly bogging down ex parte
applications.
Further, a Constitutional Advocate would have all of the procedural
tools that are necessary to create a proper adversary system. Most
importantly, as a direct party to the action, this Constitutional Advocate
194. A public defender, like CJA counsel, is the actual attorney for the targeted individual. By
contrast, a Constitutional Advocate would be a government position that steps in to oppose the
government and represent the third-party interests of the targeted individual. But Congress could
consider the structure of how public defenders are assigned in order to determine how Constitutional
Advocates are assigned to particular cases and how many advocates would be necessary.
195. [Redacted], 2011 WL 10945618, at *24 (holding that the acquisition of foreign intelligence
information pursuant to § 702 of FISA falls within the “foreign intelligence exception” to the Fourth
Amendment because “national security” goes beyond garden-variety law enforcement objectives).
196. Order Appointing Counsel at 2, In re Pen Register, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211 (No. 06-MJ-506).
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would have the ability to appeal decisions and foster the development of
binding interpretations of the Fourth Amendment as it relates to
electronic communications. But as the next Part will discuss, there are
Article III standing requirements that would need to be satisfied in order
for a Constitutional Advocate to represent third-party rights of a targeted
individual.

V. A Constitutional Advocate Could Assert JUS TERTII Standing
for Targeted Individuals
If such a Constitutional Advocate were appointed to oppose the
government in these types of proceedings, courts should determine that
197
they have standing to represent the interests of targeted individuals. Ex
parte proceedings already go against the general structure of our judicial
system, and a Constitutional Advocate would only effectuate the guiding
principles under the case or controversy limitations of Article III.
A party is entitled to be heard in federal court only when she has
alleged a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, ensuring an
198
adversarial proceeding. In order to establish this Article III standing, a
litigant must satisfy both constitutional and prudential requirements. To
satisfy the constitutional requirements, a litigant must show: (1) that she
has suffered a concrete and particularized injury, (2) the cause of which is
fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct, (3) which is
199
likely to be redressed by the requested relief. There is no doubt that
targeted individuals would have standing to oppose the government, as
their liberty interests are directly implicated by such proceedings.
The relevant issue, however, is whether such a Constitutional
Advocate could represent the targeted individual in the context of an ex
parte ECPA application. The prudential requirement relevant to a
Constitutional Advocate is that of jus tertii standing, which provides that,
generally, litigants cannot assert the legal rights of third parties not
200
before the court. The Supreme Court has allowed litigants to bring
actions on behalf of third parties, provided three criteria are met: (1) the
litigant must have suffered an injury-in-fact, (2) the litigant must have a
close relation to the third party, and (3) a hindrance must exist, such that
201
the third party cannot protect his or her own interests. In order for a
197. See Matthew I. Hall, Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law Litigation, 80 Fordham
L. Rev. 1539, 1562 (“The standing to defend of intervenor-defendants thus becomes a determinative
issue in a relatively small number of cases: primarily, those in which the intervenor seeks appellate
review of a trial court judgment not appealed by the original defendant . . . .”).
198. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968); see also U.S. Const. art. III, § 3.
199. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
200. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953) (“Apart from the jurisdictional requirement, this
Court has developed a complementary rule of self-restraint . . . which ordinarily precludes a person
from challenging the constitutionality of state action by invoking the rights of others.”).
201. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 41011 (1991).
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court to find that the Constitutional Advocate can assert jus tertii
standing, the advocate would need to be able to satisfy each of these
three requirements.
Before addressing how a Constitutional Advocate would satisfy
these requirements, it would be helpful to recognize an exception that
does not apply here. Specifically, the Supreme Court’s prohibition of one
defendant asserting the Fourth Amendment rights of another would-be
202
defendant. When deciding a case against Defendant A, and presenting
evidence obtained from Defendant B, the court need not determine
whether evidence was obtained as part of an illegal search conducted
upon Defendant B. The Court has explicitly stated that the analysis within
these types of cases falls “under the heading of substantive Fourth
Amendment doctrine,” and does not fall under “the heading of
203
standing.” In the context of this Note, however, the issue is purely
whether Congress may appoint a Constitutional Advocate who can assert
the rights of third parties. This is distinct from the issue of whether one
defendant may question the validity of a search upon another would-be
204
defendant.
A. A Constitutional Advocate Would Have the Requisite “InjuryIn-Fact” for Purposes of Asserting the Rights of a Third Party
In order to assert jus tertii standing, the Supreme Court first requires
205
that the litigant must have an injury-in-fact. This requirement ensures a
“concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
206
questions.” However, the Supreme Court has recognized injuries under
jus tertii standing that would not typically satisfy a “particularized injury”
under traditional Article III standing, suggesting the injury requirement
is lower in this context.
As an example of this relaxed injury requirement, consider Powers
v. Ohio. There, the Court held that improper jury selection caused a
“cognizable injury” to the defendant, and therefore the defendant had a

202. See Rakas v. Illnois, 439 U.S. 128, 150 (1978) (affirming the defendant’s conviction because it
was unnecessary to decide whether the search violated the rights secured to someone else by the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments). But see Powers, 499 U.S. at 411 (“These criteria have been
satisfied in cases where we have permitted criminal defendants to challenge their convictions by
raising the rights of third parties.”).
203. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140.
204. As Justice Scalia’s dissent in Powers highlights, one party asserting the rights of another is
distinct. Powers, 499 U.S. at 428 (Scalia, J., dissenting). To the extent there is overlap between the
issues, the majority opinion in Powers has long favored allowing the assertion of a third party’s rights,
so long as the requisite elements are met. Id. at 41011.
205. Id. at 411.
206. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2687 (2013) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
204 (1962)).
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207

“concrete interest in challenging the practice.” It seems logical that a
criminal defendant, whose ultimate liberty is at issue, would obviously
have a “concrete interest” in asserting a juror’s third-party rights.
According to the Court, however, the injury did not stem from the juror’s
208
potential disposition in the case. Rather, the injury existed because
racial discrimination “casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process”
209
and places the “fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt.” Such
“doubt” would not usually be the type of “particularized injury” required
210
under Article III, and thus, the rationale underlying Powers is that the
injury requirement is less substantial when asserting a third party’s rights
211
than if a litigant were simply asserting her own rights.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has relaxed this prong in the context
of Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests, where there is no
articulated injury at all, suggesting that the injury prong may be relaxed
212
even further when appropriate. FOIA allows individuals to petition the
government for certain records, and the statute provides a cause of
213
action if these records are not provided “in a timely manner.” The
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that any litigant may petition the
courts for such records, regardless of their reasons or justification for
214
doing so. One observer has noted that this precedent has led to a line
215
of cases—the “birther” cases —that would otherwise be considered a
216
prohibited “generalized grievance.” This suggests that the injury
threshold may be lowered when appropriate.
One example of where it would be appropriate to relax the injury
prong is when a government official represents the interests of third
207. Powers, 499 U.S. at 411.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
211. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 427 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (“[H]ow do these alleged perceptions of
unfairness, these ‘castings of doubt’ and ‘invitations to cynicism,’ establish that the defendant has been
injured in fact? They plainly do not.” (quotations and emphasis in original)); see also Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. at 2687 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 50001 (1975) (“In some circumstances, countervailing
considerations may outweigh the concerns underlying the usual reluctance to exert judicial power
when the plaintiff’s claim to relief rests on the legal rights of third parties.”)).
212. Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 169, 172 (2012) (“[Justice Scalia] could have cited even more devastating proof that
Congress sometimes has the power to relax or eliminate other supposed minimum requirements of the
Article III standing doctrine—including injury-in-fact.”).
213. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(iii) (2006).
214. See, e.g., NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 220 (1978) (“[U]nless the
requested material falls within [a] statutory exemption[], FOIA requires that records and material in
the possession of federal agencies be made available on demand to any member of the general public.”).
215. Litigants have repeatedly attempted to use FOIA to petition the government for copies of
President Obama’s birth certificate. See, e.g., Taitz v. Ruemmler, No. 11-1421, 2011 WL 4916936, at *1
(D.D.C. Oct. 17, 2011), aff’d, No. 11-5306, 2012 WL 1922284 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
216. Lee & Ellis, supra note 211, at 19697 (“The ‘birther’ cases are a prime example of the
generalized grievances that federal courts are willing to entertain in the name of FOIA.”).
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217

parties. Consider the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Windsor, where the Court upheld standing for the Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group—comprised of members of the House of
Representatives—after the Obama Administration refused to defend the
218
constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act. The Court’s holding
was the exact opposite as that in its sister case, Hollingsworth v. Perry,
where the Court held that presenters of a state ballot initiative did not
219
have standing to defend the constitutionality of Proposition 8. The
primary difference between these two cases was that the litigants in
Windsor were members of the government, whereas the litigants in
Hollingsworth were little more than “concerned bystanders” that had
220
brought the ballot initiative just as any citizen in California could.
Here, these same considerations should weigh in favor of allowing a
Constitutional Advocate to represent the interests of a targeted individual.
Above all, a Constitutional Advocate is necessary to preserve the
adversarial nature of ECPA orders and develop the law. Given that
“integrity of the judicial process” and “fairness” drove the Court’s
221
decision in Powers, the injury prong should similarly be satisfied here.
Ultimately, a Constitutional Advocate is needed because of the inherent
unfairness to defendants that are unable to adequately oppose ECPA
222
applications before they are granted. And without appellate review, the
integrity of the judicial process in ex parte ECPA proceedings will
223
inevitably be called into question.
Like the litigants in Windsor, a Constitutional Advocate would be
an official position within the government that could be appointed at the
224
court’s discretion in cases that focus on significant issues under ECPA.
217. Compare Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 268889 (holding that members of Congress had standing to
defend the Defense of Marriage Act when the U.S. Executive Branch refused to defend it), with
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2663 (2013) (holding that individuals who had first put forth a
ballot initiative did not have standing to defend Prop 8 when the California Executive Branch refused
to defend it).
218. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 268889.
219. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2663. Proposition 8 was a voter-enacted ballot initiative that amended the
California Constitution to provide that only marriage between a man and a woman was valid, thereby
eliminating the right of same-sex couples to marry. Id. at 2659.
220. Compare Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 268889 (upholding standing for members of Congress to
support § 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act), with Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2663 (denying standing because
“Petitioners here hold no office and have always participated in this litigation solely as private parties”).
221. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991).
222. See supra Part II.
223. See supra Part II.C; see also Smith, supra note 2, at 326 (“[E]xcessive secrecy effectively
shields electronic surveillance orders from appellate review, thereby depriving the judiciary of its normal role
in shaping, adapting, and updating legislation to fit changing factual (and technological) settings over
time.”).
224. As a point of comparison, consider Federal Public Defendant Organizations, which are
“federal entities, and their staffs are federal employees.” Appointment of Counsel, supra note 161 (“The
chief federal public defender is appointed to a four-year term by the court of appeals of the circuit in
which the organization is located.”). Similarly, ex relatione cases most commonly allow the government
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Courts have consistently made these types of discretionary decisions to
either appoint counsel or call for amicus curiae briefs, which is an easy
analogy courts can rely upon to identify situations in which this advocate
225
should be invoked. Thus, the same considerations that led the Supreme
Court to relax this prong in Windsor should be persuasive here as well.
Courts should be willing to determine that such a Constitutional
Advocate satisfies the injury-in-fact prong of this prudential prohibition
because it would facilitate the adversarial process, which currently does
not exist in ex parte ECPA proceedings. This injury prong is less relevant
here, where the Constitutional Advocate would be an official government
position.
B. A Constitutional Advocate Would Have the Requisite “Close
Relation” with the Targeted Individual
The second requirement of jus tertii standing is that the litigant must
have a “close relation” with the third party, so that the litigant can
226
effectively represent the third party. This close relation has never been
227
a high threshold to meet. For example, in Powers, the Supreme Court
found a close relation between a criminal defendant and an excluded
228
juror whom he had never met. This close relation was primarily because
of their shared goal of eliminating racial discrimination from the
229
courtroom. Similarly, the Court found the close relation requirement
was met between a beer vendor and his potential customers, when he
asserted the rights of his male beer-consuming customers against an
Oklahoma law that allowed men and women to purchase beer at different
230
ages. Because this factor focuses on the shared interests of the parties,
and not necessarily their literal relationship, this requirement is a
relatively low threshold to satisfy.
Here, a Constitutional Advocate’s sole duty would be to oppose the
government in otherwise-ex parte requests under ECPA, which she
could do more effectively than the targeted individual. Similar to Powers,
both the Constitutional Advocate and the third party would have the
to bring a claim for private parties with an interest in the matter. Black’s Law Dictionary 248 (9th ed.
2009). This suggests that standing requirements are more relaxed when the government itself intervenes as a
party. See generally Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 268889 (holding that members of Congress satisfied Article
III standing to defend the Defense of Marriage Act).
225. See Simard, supra note 184, at 687.
226. Powers, 499 U.S. at 411.
227. Id. at 413 (“In certain circumstances, the relationship between the litigant and the third party
may be such that the former is fully, or very nearly, as effective a proponent of the right as the latter.”
(quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 41314 (“Both the excluded juror and the criminal defendant have a common interest in
eliminating racial discrimination from the courtroom . . . . This congruence of interests makes it
necessary and appropriate for the defendant to raise the rights of the juror.”).
230. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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shared interest of opposing the government to ensure the requirements
of ECPA and the Fourth Amendment were satisfied as well.
Because of the secrecy proceedings surrounding ECPA, it would be
largely impossible for the Constitutional Advocate to establish a literal
231
relationship with the targeted individual. But that type of literal
relationship has not been required by the Supreme Court under Powers
232
or Craig v. Boren. And more importantly, a Constitutional Advocate
would be able to oppose the government without doing harm to the
secrecy proceedings that Congress has deemed necessary to facilitate
obtaining these electronic communications. For proponents of ECPA,
this is a far more effective and efficient outcome than allowing targeted
individuals to oppose the government themselves. As a result of the
shared common goal between the Constitutional Advocate and the
targeted individual, there would be enough of a “close relation” to satisfy
jus tertii standing under Powers.
C. Targeted Individuals Are “Hindered” from Representing Their
Own Interests
The third requirement of jus tertii standing requires that some
hindrance must exist, which prevents third parties from asserting their
233
own interests. This is still satisfied where the third party could, but as a
234
practical matter usually does not, bring a suit. In Powers, for example,
although jurors who were improperly dismissed on account of their race
had the “legal right to bring suit on their own behalf,” the Court allowed
the defendant to assert their interests because “[a]s a practical matter, []
235
these challenges are rare.” The Court found this especially persuasive
because of “the small financial stake involved and the economic burdens
236
of litigation.” Thus, this requirement does not require that third parties
be completely barred from preventing their own rights, but rather only
requires that some barrier exists that makes asserting those rights more
difficult.
237
Here, as discussed above, the targeted individual has no opportunity
to oppose the government before these ECPA orders are granted. The
entire reason a Constitutional Advocate would be helpful in ECPA
proceedings stems from the fact that targeted individuals are unable to
assert their own interests, as shown by the thousands of ECPA orders

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

See supra Part II.B.
See Powers, 499 U.S. at 411; see also Craig, 429 U.S. at 194.
See Powers, 499 U.S. at 411.
Id. at 414.
See id.
Id. at 415.
See supra Part II.B.
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238

that go unopposed and unappealed each year. Even though a targeted
individual could theoretically assert her own defense against the
government, the reality of ECPA’s statutory scheme is that defendants
239
will rarely be incentivized to mount a criminal defense or a civil claim.
As demonstrated by Powers, this type of hindrance is precisely what the
240
Court had in mind when contemplating this requirement.
As a result, each of the prudential requirements of jus tertii
standing—(1) that the litigant suffers an injury-in-fact; (2) that the
litigant shares close relation with the third party; and (3) that some
hindrance exists to prevent the third party from asserting their own
rights—would be satisfied to establish an exception to the general
prohibition against representing the interests of third parties. First, a
Constitutional Advocate would be an official position within the
government, making it appropriate for courts to lower the injury-in-fact
requirement. And similar to the injury upheld in Powers, the specific
injury here would stem from the unfairness of ex parte ECPA proceedings
and the resulting loss of integrity within the judicial system. Second, a
Constitutional Advocate would share with the litigant an interest in
opposing the government and adequately developing arguments in support
of constitutional protections of the targeted individual’s information.
Third, a Constitutional Advocate would remedy the practical reality that
targeted individuals are rarely able to mount a constitutional defense to
oppose the government after their information has already been obtained.
Because each of these three factors would be satisfied, a Constitutional
Advocate would be able to assert jus tertii standing to represent the
interests of targeted individuals in otherwise-ex parte ECPA proceedings.

Conclusion
Privacy law in the United States has stagnated because the government
has remained willfully ignorant as to how the Fourth Amendment relates
to burgeoning electronic communications. A primary reason for this
stagnation is because the government pursues ECPA orders ex parte,
and there are few remedies to protect a targeted individual once the
information is obtained.
The solution is to increase opposition to the government in these
otherwise-ex parte proceedings. Whether that is achieved by ISPs resisting
238. Id.
239. When faced with criminal charges, a defendant will rarely pursue the civil remedies available
for a violation of the statute. Kerr, supra note 35, at 818. Moreover, in order to suppress evidence
obtained in violation of ECPA, the defendant would have to successfully demonstrate a violation of
the Fourth Amendment and overcome a good faith defense from the law enforcement official in order
to suppress the information. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (recognizing a good faith exception to
the suppression of improperly obtained evidence). The practical outcome is that defendants rarely oppose
the government under either avenue. See supra Part II.C.
240. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 414–15.
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government applications for user information, by courts appointing CJA
counsel to represent the targeted individual, or by the appointment of a
Constitutional Advocate, the end result would be an adversarial proceeding
that would help develop the issues before the courts. Moreover, each of
these three parties has the key tool necessary to develop the law: the
right to appeal adverse decisions.
The only way to incentivize the development of Fourth Amendment
protections is to allow parties to oppose the government with full
procedural rights and develop binding appellate precedent. Appointment
of a Constitutional Advocate would restore the adversarial nature of
these proceedings and protect against the wanton disclosure of targeted
individuals’ information.

